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Abstract 
Despite the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the US decision not to comply with 
its Kyoto commitments seems to drastically undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol 
in controlling GHG emissions. Therefore, it is important to explore whether there are 
economic incentives that might help the US to modify its current decision and move to 
a more environmentally effective climate policy. For example, can an increased 
participation of developing countries induce the US to effectively participate in the 
effort to reduce GHG emissions? Is a single emission trading market the appropriate 
policy framework to increase the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol? This paper 
addresses the above questions by analysing whether the participation of China in the 
cooperative effort to control GHG emissions can provide adequate incentives for the 
US to re-join the Kyoto process and eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This paper 
analyses three different climate regimes in which China could be involved and assesses 
the economic incentives for the major world countries and regions to participate in 
these three regimes. The main conclusion is that the participation of the US in a 
climate regime is not likely, at least in the short run. The US is more likely to adopt 
unilateral policies than to join the present Kyoto coalition (even when it includes 
China). However, a two bloc regime would become the most preferred option if both 
China and the US, for some political or environmental reasons, decide to cooperate on 
GHG emission control. If the US decides to cooperate, the climate regime that provides 
the highest economic incentives to the cooperating countries is the one in which China 
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1.  Introduction  
In March 2001, the President of the United States, George W. Bush, 
announced that the US would not comply with the Kyoto Protocol in its 
present form. Following this decision, some countries reacted by 
strengthening their commitment to continue the Kyoto process, whereas 
other countries decided to fall in line with the US strategy (Cf. Section 2 
below). In particular, Russia has adopted an ambiguous position, thus 
raising a lot of uncertainty as to whether and when the Kyoto Protocol will 
come effectively into force. This uncertainty has recently been resolved, 
because Russia decided to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which entered into 
force on February 16, 2005. 
 
However, the environmental effectiveness of the Protocol is still limited. 
Indeed, the US withdrawal and the new provisions included in the 
Marrakech agreement imply a strong decline in the global amount of GHG 
emissions to be actually abated. In addition, the US defection induces a 
decreasing demand for emission permits and consequently a decline in the 
permit price, namely the cost of a unit of carbon, thus reducing the 




Accordingly, several doubts have emerged on the appropriateness and sense 
of pursuing the Kyoto Protocol in its actual form. In particular, the low 
environmental impact of this policy framework has induced new debates 
about the need to increase the number of participating countries. On the one 
                                                      
1 Some studies highlight feedback effects that can mitigate the fall in the permit price. 
Strategic market behaviours can indeed modify the size of the expected changes in prices 
and abatement costs. In particular, these changes may be smaller than initially suggested. 
For example, banking and monopolistic behaviour in the permit market (Manne and 
Richels 2001; Den Elzen and de Moor 2001; Böhringer and Löschel 2001) or strategic 
R&D behaviour (Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo 2002) may limit the demand shift and 
reduce the decline of the permit price consequent to the US withdrawal from the Kyoto 
Protocol.  
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hand, the need to involve the US again in international efforts to combat 
climate change is emphasised, while on the other hand the role and future 
participation of developing countries has assumed greater importance. 
 
Therefore, one of the goals of this paper is to analyse how climate 
negotiations may evolve after the coming into force of the Kyoto Protocol 
and beyond 2012. The crucial question is what participation incentives are 
provided by the present constellation of Kyoto countries, and consequently 
what the future participation decisions of some key players might be. The 
most important of these key players is certainly the US. It is widely 
recognised that US participation would strongly increase the environmental 
effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, this paper addresses the 
following questions: Are there economic incentives for the US to move back 
to the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. does the US benefit from joining the current 
climate regime? What kind of climate regime could provide adequate 
economic incentives for the US to join a climate coalition? In order to 
reduce abatement costs, does the US find it profitable to sign a bilateral deal 
with a low abatement cost country?  
 
Some of these questions have been explored in other recent papers. For 
example, in Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo and Marchiori (2002) the 
effectiveness of an “issue linkage” strategy that links climate and R&D 
cooperation is assessed, whereas Buchner and Carraro (2004) analyse 
whether a climate regime entirely based on technological cooperation, 
without binding emission targets, could be supported by the US. In both 
papers, the main goal is to identify policy strategies that increase US 
participation incentives. 
 
This paper also addresses the issue of participation incentives, but from a 
different viewpoint. Here the goal is to  ascertain whether China, by 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and eventually participating in an international 
emissions trading market, can provide the US with adequate economic  
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incentives to join a climate coalition and to achieve the emission targets 
defined in Kyoto. Let us stress that the focus of this paper is on economic 
incentives. There are several other political, cultural, environmental factors 
that could influence the US decision to adopt a more effective climate 
policy. These will not be addressed in this paper. However, the economic 
dimension of climate negotiations is a very important one (and it has often 
been considered as the most important one in the US). Therefore, this paper 
can provide a relevant, albeit partial, contribution to the analysis of the 
future evolution of international climate policy.
2 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, it analyses the 
evolution which led to the current climate regime, by identifying the 
economic and political forces that are responsible for the present situation. 
Then, in Section 3, some game theory results on the economic incentives 
that China’s participation in a climate agreement provides for the US to 
modify its decision on the Kyoto Protocol are discussed. The presence of 
China in a climate coalition could indeed reduce GHG abatement costs in a 
way that could make the Kyoto Protocol the most economically attractive 
climate strategy for the US. Therefore, this paper shows costs and benefits 
of China’s decision to cooperate with the Annex B-US countries (all Annex B 
countries less the US and Australia) in controlling GHG emissions. In 
addition, the paper provides a quantitative game theory analysis of US 
participation incentives, both in the case of a single coalition in which the 
Annex B-US countries, China and the US participate, and in the case of a 
bilateral deal between China and the US (a two country coalition) which 
could be complementary to the Kyoto coalition. A final section summarises 
our conclusions. 
 
                                                      
2 For a discussion of the political factors behind the role played by China and the US in 
climate policy negotiations see Zhang (2004).  
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2.  Policy evolution after the Marrakech negotiations. A short overview 
The political deal reached in Marrakech at the Seventh Conference of 
Parties (COP-7) has legally confirmed the existence of a “tri-polar climate 
change regime” (Egenhofer and Legge 2001), where the first group of 
cooperating countries consists of the industrialised countries less the US and 
Australia, the second one consists of the developing countries, while the last 
one is formed by the United States of America and Australia. 
 
Within the other two major groups, some sub-groups can be identified. In 
particular, the group of industrialised countries can be divided into: (i) the 
European Union, including ‘its near abroad’; (ii) Russia; and (iii) the 
Umbrella Group, which after COP-7 still included Japan, Canada and New 
Zealand. After the US defection and given the EU commitment to the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Umbrella group countries and Russia achieved notable 
bargaining power in climate negotiations. As a consequence of the increased 
stringency of the 55% provision of Art. 25 of the Kyoto Protocol – and after 
the ratification of the EU, Japan and Canada – Russia has become the key 
player. Moreover, Russia also plays a special role in the prospective permit 
market, because of the amount of emission allowances (‘hot air’) that Russia 
possesses, at least in the first commitment period.  
 
Another group of countries includes the developing countries, which are not 
bound by any emission reduction targets in the first commitment period of 
the Kyoto Protocol, being however already involved in mitigation activities 
through various obligations, e.g., reporting requirements. Nevertheless, 
since they are going to represent the largest future CO2 producers, their 
participation in a climate agreement is necessary for emission reductions to 
attain a level consistent with the stabilisation of GHG concentration below 
600ppmv. In addition, this involvement is also requested by the US to  
  5




In light of this complex situation, what happened after the Marrakech 
Conference of the Parties? One month after COP-7, in December 2001, the 
EU had already made some progress by compiling a “Draft Proposal for a 
Council Decision concerning the approval, on behalf of the European 
Community, of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the joint fulfilment of commitments 
thereunder” (EC 2001). The European Union announced the ratification of 
the treaty on May 31
st, 2002. Moreover, within the context of COP-8 in 
New Delhi, the EU clearly stated that Kyoto must be considered as ‘the only 
show in town’, urging other countries to participate and criticising again the 
US for their refusal to ratify Kyoto (The Hindu, Oct. 24
th   2002). The 
approval of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in October 2003 further 
confirms the commitment of the European Union
 4. 
 
In Japan, the decision process towards the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
met with a number of contradictory signals. In January 2002, The Japan 
Times reported that Japan was planning  to ratify the Kyoto Protocol early 
in 2002 (The Japan Times, Jan. 21
st 2002).
5 Despite these early promising 
signs, the ratification was postponed several times due to internal problems, 
first to March 2002 and then to late Spring 2002. Widely divergent views 
held by two government ministries over climate change control strategies – 
                                                      
3 The lack of participation by developing countries has been one of the main US criticisms 
of the Kyoto Protocol and was re-stated by the US Senate when voting against the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. 
4 The EU ETS covers about 45 percent of the total EU 25 GHG emissions, accounting for 
more than 12,000 fixed sources, and will start in 2005. This will create the world’s largest 
ever market of emissions rights. In addition, the so-called “Linking Directive” has entered 
into force. This enables firms to use credits from CDM and JI mechanisms in the EU ETS 
market.  
5 Even if the ratification  was postponed, on February 1
st 2002 the government announced 
an anti-global warming bill in line with the Kyoto Protocol which would be implemented 
soon (Kyodo News, Feb. 1
st 2002).  
  6
in particular over domestic measures to be taken to meet the emission 
targets – and uncertainties over the plans of other key players, e.g. Canada 
and Australia, were main reasons behind Japan’s delayed ratification.
6 
Furthermore, although Japan did manage to achieve a number of 
concessions in Marrakech, business groups still were reluctant to support the 
Kyoto Protocol. They feared that the commitment to the Kyoto emission 
reduction targets could lead to a competitive disadvantage with respect to 
the US.
7 However, despite these controversies, the Japanese Cabinet 




Russia has also had some difficulties in deciding on a clear position with 
regard to  the Kyoto Protocol after the US withdrawal. The increase in its 
bargaining power has motivated Russia to further exploit its strong 
negotiating position. As the outcome of COP-7 demonstrated, the need to 
induce Russia to participate in the agreement translated into various 
concessions to Russia, e.g. less stringent targets or increased flexibility (e.g. 
increased sinks allowances). As a consequence, in March 2002, the Russian 
Energy Minister Igor Yusufov announced that Russia intends to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol soon (RBC network, March 11
th 2002). However, some 
weeks after this announcement, Russia emphasised that its ratification was 
far from guaranteed and would depend strongly on both the EU and Japan’s 
                                                      
6 For more detailed information see for example (CO2e.com, Feb.13
th 2002; Asahi 
Shimbun, Feb. 11
th 2002; Christian Science Monitor, March 12
th 2002; Japan Today News, 
Feb. 26
th 2002 and Kyodo News, Feb. 21
st 2002). 
7 For more detailed information see for example (BBC, Jan, 3
rd 2002; CO2e.com, Jan. 8
th 
2002; The Japan Times, Jan. 17
th 2002; The Japan Times, Jan. 18
th 2002). 
8 Due to the strong links with the US economy, Japan is still particularly worried about the 
US plans on climate change control and there are signs that Japan plans to enhance its 
cooperation with the US on climate change control. Even before ratifying the Kyoto 
Protocol, Japan started preliminary talks with the US aimed at discussing how Japan and 
the US might cooperate to reduce GHG emissions (The Japan Times, Feb. 27
th 2002; Japan 
Today News, Feb. 27
th 2002). In early April 2002, government officials from Japan and the 
US agreed on 15 steps to prevent global warming (CO2e.com, April 5
th 2002). Although 
Japan finally decided to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, its parallel initiatives with the US and its 
efforts to convince other countries of the advantages and necessity to participate in the 
Kyoto agreement demonstrate that Japan is still  dubious and concerned about  the present 
climate regime. See for example (Japan Today News, Jan. 19
th 2002 and Japan Today 
News, Feb. 27
th 2002; Japan Today News, June 4
th 2002).  
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future strategies. Russian government officials said that Russia may delay 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol until these countries give their official 
consent to buy carbon dioxide emission credits from Russia (Financial 
Times, March 22
nd 2002; Yomiuri Shimbun, March 28
th 2002). In addition, 
at a high level ministerial meeting in New Delhi during COP-8, Russia 
called upon all developed countries to comply, in particular those who are 
members of the UNFCCC, and also called on the need for the active future 
participation of the developing countries (The Hindu, Oct. 31
st 2002). 
 
Although never seriously threatening to formally defect, Russia clearly 
exploited its high bargaining power and continued to send contradictory 
signals with respect to its position on the Kyoto treaty. In particular, the 
Climate Change Conference, held in Moscow from September 29
th to 
October 3
rd, 2003, was tempered by announcements indicating that the 
Kyoto Protocol is unlikely to come into force in the near future. President 
Putin’s opening address explained that Russia’s position had considerably 
changed during the last year. Putin said that Russia has not made a decision 
on whether to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and will not do so until it had 
finished studying the implications that ratification would have for the 
country, looking also at the benefits that could arise from global warming to 
a northern country like Russia (Cf. RFE/RL, Sept. 29
th 2003). The insistence 
that more research is needed represented a further piece of Russia’s strategic 
bargaining strategy, rather than indicating that it did not intend to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol at all. The debate on the Kyoto Protocol was eventually 
closed when the EU linked Russia ratification to some concessions on 
Russia accession to the WTO (Cf. Buchner and Dall’Olio, 2004). This latter 
incentive, and the fact that Russia’s industry and NGOs both were largely in 
favour of  ratification
9, induced the Duma and President Putin to ratify the 
                                                      
9 In particular, Russian industries see the potential benefits arising from joint projects where 
European countries invest in the introduction of cleaner technologies in Russian plants (see 
e.g. The International Herald Tribune, Oct. 28
th 2003).  
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Kyoto Protocol on November 4, 2004. This decision opened the way to the 
coming into force of the Protocol on February 16, 2005.  
 
An important step forward in the Kyoto process was achieved at the UN 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg 
from August 26
th to September 4
th, 2002
10,  where China announced it 
would ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Already in January 2002, China had 
expressed its favourable views on the Kyoto Protocol and surprised the 
world by calling it a “win-win deal for industrialised and poorer countries 
alike” and by pushing for an earliest possible enforcement of the treaty 
(Planet Ark, Jan. 18
th 2002). This statement showed that China was getting 
serious not only about domestic environmental protection, but also about 
international cooperation to control climate change. China confirmed its 
willingness to participate in the Kyoto framework by approving the treaty 
on August 30
th, 2002. Despite the lack of a reduction target for greenhouse 
gas emissions
11, Beijing's decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol is generally 
considered as an important boost to the domestic and international fight 
against global warming (ABC Online, Sept. 3
rd 2002).  
 
After China, on September 2
nd, 2002, Canada’s Prime Minister Jean 
Chrétien announced in Johannesburg that the Canadian Parliament  would 
be asked to ratify the Kyoto Protocol by the end of 2002 (The Globe and 
Mail, Sept. 2
nd 2002). Notwithstanding some strong criticisms on the Prime 
Minister’s strategy by Canadian provincial governments (see, e.g., Toronto 
Star, Sept. 4
th 2002), Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol on December 17
th, 
2002 (Toronto Star, Dec. 17
th 2002). 
 
                                                      
10 For an overview on the key outcomes of the Johannesburg Summit see e.g., United 
Nations (2002). 
11 China has said it is open to exploring cooperation opportunities  under the Kyoto 
agreement, in the short run and primarily with respect to financial and technical aid deals. 
Chinese officials emphasise that the government will voluntarily try to restrict the growth 
of CO2 emissions, but is strictly opposing binding GHG reduction targets (The Japan 
Times, Jan. 26
th 2002).  
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During all the aforementioned discussions, the two main countries that 
refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the US and Australia, have been both 
nationally and internationally strongly criticised for “taking positions solely 
on the basis of national interests” (The Age, August 30
th 2002). 
Subsequently, the US President George Bush was urged by a delegation of 
US congressmen to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, while the Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard softened his initial stance on Kyoto (ABC News, 
Sept. 4
th 2002). Nonetheless, Australian Federal Environment Minister 
David Kemp then defended his country's refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
(Sky News, Sept. 4
th 2002). Both the US and Australia have justified their 
opposition to Kyoto by pointing at the lack of participation by the large 
developing countries above all. 
 
This last remark is important, because no effective climate policy can be 
implemented without an active involvement of the US and Australia. Even 
though the Kyoto Protocol eventually came into force, its environmental 
effectiveness without the US and Australia is very low.
12 The US, the 
world’s largest producer of GHG emissions, not only remains outside the 
Kyoto framework, but has also announced a weak alternative climate 
change policy. As a consequence, three issues need to be explored: (i) What 
are the economic incentives for the US to re-join the Kyoto coalition or to 
form another parallel coalition cooperating on GHG emission reduction? (ii) 
What strategy can Japan, Russia and the EU try to implement in order to 
induce the US to ratify the Kyoto Protocol? (iii) Can climate cooperation 
better be achieved outside the Kyoto framework ? 
 
                                                      
12 Several simulations suggest that the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol 
would be low even with the US and Australia (Cf. Böhringer, 2003). The problem is that 
the Kyoto Protocol sets weak emissions limits that are unlikely to reduce global warming. 
However, the participation of the US is still crucial, both because the US is the largest 
world GHG emitter and because without US participation it is very difficult to start a 
negotiation on abatement targets for the developing countries. 
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This paper addresses the first question, by looking at the economic 
incentives for the US to participate in future climate regimes.
13 In particular, 
the analysis presented in the next sections will be centred on the role of 
China and on the new economic incentives that China’s participation in an 
international permit market may provide to the other countries.  
 
3.  An applied game-theoretic analysis of the role played by China in 
possible future climate regimes 
The first climate regime that we plan to analyse using the FEEM-RICE 
model
14 is the one in which the European Union, Japan, the Former Soviet 
Union (the so called Annex B-US countries) and China cooperate to reduce 
GHG emissions.
15 This is not to claim that a climate regime with Annex B-
US countries and China is the most likely scenario. We simply aim to 
quantify the benefits that China’s participation in a cooperative effort to 
control GHG emissions could provide to the Annex B-US countries. 
Therefore, as a first step, we analyse gains and losses that would result from  
the formation of a climate coalition formed by the European Union, Japan, 
Russia and China. To achieve this goal, we quantify changes in welfare, 
emissions, abatement costs and R&D investments induced by the formation 
of this coalition. These changes are computed with respect to the values of 
the above variables in the present Annex B-US regime, namely a coalition 
formed by the EU, FSU and Japan, which we thus consider as our 
benchmark, or business-as-usual scenario. In this benchmark scenario, 
which follows the coming into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU, FSU 
and Japan meet their Kyoto targets in the first commitment period and 
                                                      
13 As stated in the Introduction, the second question is partly answered in Buchner, Carraro, 
Cersosimo and Marchiori (2002), whereas the third question is addressed in Buchner and 
Carraro (2004). 
14 Cf. Nordhaus and Yang (1996). Our version of RICE has been proposed in Buonanno, 
Carraro and Galeotti (2003). A short description of the FEEM-RICE model is in the 
Appendix. 
15 Given the geographical disaggregation of the FEEM-RICE model, it is not possible to 
account for the presence of Canada in the coalition. Moreover, Russia cannot be 
distinguished from the other countries of the Former Soviet Union.  
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As stated above, our main goal is to assess whether the presence of China in 
the coalition provides sufficient economic incentives for the US to comply 
with the Kyoto Protocol. In particular, we analyse whether China’s adoption 
of quantitative emission limits provides new incentives for the US to 
cooperate within the Kyoto cap-and-trade framework. After China’s 
decision, GHG abatement costs may indeed become much lower and may 
therefore make the Kyoto Protocol the economically most attractive climate 
strategy, even for the US. 
 
To address the above issue, we need to consider a second scenario in which 
a coalition formed by the US, EU, FSU, Japan and China adopts policies to 
reduce GHG emissions. Again, changes of welfare, emissions, abatement 
costs and R&D investments induced by the formation of this coalition are 
going to be quantified using the FEEM-RICE model. This makes it possible 
to compare the net benefits of a large coalition in which the US participates, 
with the net benefits gained if the US is out, but China is in. However, the 
US may decide to participate in the international effort to control GHG 
emissions not by joining the Annex B-US coalition, but by forming another 
parallel coalition with China. Therefore, we will compute the economic 
consequences of this third scenario and compare its strengths and 
weaknesses with those of the other two scenarios. 
 
As shown in the Appendix, the FEEM-RICE model is a version of 
Nordhaus’ RICE model (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996) in which endogenous 
and induced technical change are represented. In this version, technical 
change plays a twofold role: on the one hand, via increasing returns to scale, 
it yields endogenous growth; on the other hand, by affecting the 
                                                      
16 Therefore, in our BAU, the US and other countries that do not comply with the Kyoto 
Protocol may reduce emissions, although in a non cooperative manner.    
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emission/output ratio, it accounts for the adoption of cleaner and energy-
saving technologies.
17 In addition, international technological spillovers are 
accounted for. 
 
In the FEEM-RICE model, six countries/regions (US, EU, Japan (JPN), 
Former Soviet Union (FSU), China (CHN) and rest of the world (ROW)) 
optimally set the intertemporal values of four strategic variables: 
investments, R&D expenditure, abatement effort and net demand for 
emission permits.
18 When no coalition forms, each country/region 
maximises its own individual welfare given the other countries’ strategy. 
When coalitions form, countries belonging to the same coalition maximise 
their joint welfare. Given the interdependency of countries’ decisions, the 
equilibrium values of the policy variables are obtained by solving a dynamic 
open-loop Nash game between the six countries/regions. 
 
Three important assumptions qualify our results. First, it is assumed that all 
countries/regions which adhere to the Kyoto/Bonn agreement  meet the 
Kyoto constraints from 2010 onward.
19 We therefore adopt the so-called 
‘Kyoto forever’ hypothesis (see, for example, Manne and Richels 1999 and 
many others). As a consequence, our reference to the Kyoto/Bonn 
agreement is partly imprecise because, for the sake of brevity, we will 
sometimes call ‘Kyoto Protocol’ or ‘Kyoto/Bonn agreement’ a ‘Kyoto 
                                                      
17 The FEEM-RICE model has already been used in Buonanno, Carraro, Castelnuovo and 
Galeotti (2001), Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti (2002), Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo 
(2002), Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo and Marchiori (2002) and in Buchner and Carraro 
(2004). A brief description is contained in the Appendix. 
18 Notice that, in all climate regimes, abatement is a strategic variable, which is optimally 
set at its welfare maximising level by countries both inside and outside the coalition. 
Coalition members adopting  the emission targets decided in Kyoto  may decide to reduce 
emissions below the target. 
19 The use of the ‘Kyoto forever’ hypothesis may be seen as a strong assumption. However, 
the CO2 concentration levels implicit in this assumption (if RICE is a good description of 
the world) coincide with those in the A1B scenario (IPCC 2001) which can be considered 
the “median” scenario among those currently proposed. We thus use the “Kyoto-forever” 
hypothesis not because it represents a realistic scenario, but as a benchmark with respect to 
which policy alternatives can be compared.  
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forever’ scenario. In another paper, Buchner and Carraro (2003b) we test the 
robustness of the results with respect to changes in the assumption about 
future commitments. 
 
Second, it is assumed that all countries  adopt cost-effective environmental 
policies. In particular, cost-effective market mechanisms (e.g. emission 
trading) are chosen over ‘command-and-control’ measures in order to 
guarantee the  efficient implementation of environmental targets. Please 
note that our analysis focuses only on CO2. There are other man-made 
greenhouse gases and the Kyoto Protocol takes some of them into account. 
Moreover, both the Bonn agreement and the subsequent Marrakech deal 
emphasise the role of sinks in meeting the Kyoto targets. However, in the 
FEEM-RICE model only CO2 emissions are accounted for. 
 
Third, when China belongs to a climate coalition, it is assumed that it adopts 
quantitative emission limits. However, China’s emission targets over time 
are assumed to coincide with its business-as-usual emission levels, which 
take into account unilateral emission reductions that may be decided by 
China.
20 This implies that when China enters a coalition and decides to 
cooperate on GHG emission abatement, it becomes a net supplier of 
permits.  
 
Our analysis focuses on changes in the main economic variables (welfare, as 
measured by discounted future consumption levels, R&D expenditure, 
global CO2 emissions and abatement costs, for which an indicator is the 
equilibrium price in the permit market
21) with respect to the “Kyoto forever” 
scenario in which the Annex B-US  coalition forms. Results shown below 
must be interpreted as an application of a game-theory model designed to 
                                                      
20 This scenario is often assumed in the literature on climate policy (see for example Criqui 
and Philibert 2003). 
21 As we have said, a permit market is assumed to be implemented by all coalitions and 
even by singletons (domestically). Therefore, in our competitive setting, the price of 
permits is equivalent to an emission tax.  
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identify incentive mechanisms and the economic factors behind them, rather 
than to provide realistic figures on the outcomes of future policy scenarios. 
 
3.1  A single coalition with the EU, Russia, Japan and China 
Let us start by examining the economic consequences of the formation of a 
climate coalition in which four countries/regions – EU, FSU, JPN and CHN 
– cooperate to reduce GHG emissions. An emission trading market is 
implemented and all cooperating countries are allowed to trade in this 
market without restrictions.
22 The coalition formed by the EU, FSU, Japan 
and China plays a dynamic open loop Nash game with the other world 
regions. The equilibrium of the game determines the values of welfare 
changes that will be used to assess a country’s incentive to participate in a 
given coalition. 
 
Figure 1 shows the impacts on welfare, emissions and R&D investments of 
the climate coalition formed by the EU, FSU, Japan and China. When these 
countries cooperate to reduce GHG emissions, the permit price is obviously 
lower than in the case of the Annex B-US coalition. The estimated change of 
the permit price is -78.6%. The reason for this massive decline of the permit 
price is China’s participation in the permit market, which implies an 
increase in the supply of emission permits. The large boost to the supply 
side of the emission market is taken to be an expected result since, under our 
assumptions on future commitments, China can sell permits whenever its 
emissions are below the business-as-usual levels.
23 
 
                                                      
22 This assumption is not consistent with the Kyoto Protocol, in which China is allowed to 
participate only in CDM projects. However, our analysis is a counterfactual analysis, 
designed to assess what would happen if China could be involved in the emission permit 
market. 
23 In another paper, we test the robustness of equilibrium outcomes to changes in the 
scenarios defining abatement targets in the second commitment period and beyond. See 
Buchner and Carraro (2003b).  
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Thanks to this reduction in the permit price, the EU and Japan can achieve 
their own emission targets  at a lower cost than in the case of the Annex B-
US coalition. Hence, the two countries reduce their total abatement costs. 
 



















Emissions R&D USA R&D JPN R&D EU R&D CHN  R&D FSU 
T 
However, this new low-cost opportunity to comply with the Kyoto targets 
induces both the EU and Japan to invest less in R&D. Environmental-
friendly technologies and cheap abatement possibilities thereby confirm 
themselves as possible substitutes (as already shown in Buonanno, Carraro 
and Galeotti, 2002). Both the EU and Japan reduce their R&D expenditures 
with respect to the “Kyoto forever” case (see Figure 1 again). As a 
consequence of the lower abatement costs and the reduced expenditure in 
R&D, both countries increase their total welfare.
24 
                                                      
24 Let us stress that the cost reduction and welfare increase for the EU and Japan is 
computed with respect to the “Kyoto forever” scenario and not with respect to the BAU 
scenario. Therefore, we do not claim that the EU and Japan gain by adopting a climate 
policy. They gain when China enters the coalition with respect to the case in which China is 
out and cooperation takes place only between the EU, Japan and Russia. By contrast, if we 
compare welfare for coalition members in the coalition the EU, Japan and Russia (without 
US and China) with respect to the BAU welfare, then the EU and Japan suffer a loss (the 
amount of the loss depends on the amount of “hot air” sold in the market). Therefore, 




Russia suffers a high welfare loss from China’s participation in a climate 
regime. The main reason is the lower price in the permit market induced by 
China’s supply of permits. In addition, the presence in the market of a 
second large permit supplier clearly lessens the bargaining power of Russia, 
which previously controlled the permit market. By giving up its monopoly 
position, Russia reduces its profits from selling permits.  
 
When cooperating on emission reduction, China obviously loses out in 
comparison with the alternative case in which China free-rides on the other 
countries’ emission reductions. However, at the same time, China would 
profit from a large emission trading market. The net result of these two 
effects is a small welfare loss. This small loss could easily be compensated 
for by the existence of ancillary benefits, both environmental and economic, 
which are not yet accounted for by our model. A particular characteristic of 
the new situation is the large expansion of China’s R&D investments. The 
reason is that China – like Russia in the Annex B-US coalition – over invests 
in R&D to increase its sales in the emission trading market. By strongly 
investing in technological innovations, China can gain profits in the permit 
market. With respect to the Annex B-US case, China increases its R&D by 
more than 70%. 
 
What are the implications of China’s participation in the climate coalition 
for the environmental effectiveness of the protocol? Notwithstanding 
China’s participation, total emissions increase. The reason is that China has 
emission targets over time that coincide with its business-as-usual emission 
levels. In addition, emissions in the other cooperating countries slightly 
increase due to the lower incentives to undertake emission-reducing R&D.  
 
As a consequence of the increased emissions, welfare in the US becomes 
lower because of the higher environmental damages arising from the growth  
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in emissions.
25 As already stated, the main reason why emissions increase is 
the decline in total R&D. R&D is lower because the increase in R&D efforts 
by China cannot offset the fall in R&D experienced by all the other 
participating countries. The EU and Japan face lower incentives to carry out 
R&D due to the large supply of emission permits. In addition, Russia reacts 
to the entrance of a new large permit supplier by strongly lowering its R&D 
investments since its incentive to undertake strategic R&D is lower. 
 
In short, the participation of China in the climate coalition will have two 
negative effects on the US economy. First, the US experiences higher 
damage from climate change because of total higher GHG emissions. 
Second, the US misses the opportunity to abate its own emissions at the 
much lower marginal cost (permit price) that the participation of China 
yields. Are these two effects sufficient to induce the US to change its mind 
and ratify the Kyoto Protocol? 
 
3.2  A single coalition with the EU, Russia, Japan, the US and China 
In the previous section, the participation of China in the climate coalition 
was shown to provide benefits to the EU and Japan, but damages to the US 
economy. Would then the US benefit from joining the climate coalition? In 
order to address this question using the FEEM-RICE modelling framework, 
we must analyse the economic implications of a coalition consisting of 
Europe, Japan, FSU, the US and China, with only one free-rider (the Rest of 
the World). Figure 2 and Table 1 show our results. Figure 2 illustrates 
changes with respect to the “Kyoto forever” scenario. Table 1 shows the 
changes with respect to “Kyoto forever”, considering both the present 
scenario and the one discussed in the section 3.1. 
                                                      
25 As noted by one referee, this may be a result peculiar to the RICE model. Other models, 
which take adaptation into account, suggest the USA may not lose from climate change and 
may even gain, an important factor contributing to the US’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. 
However, the RICE model has no adaptation and a damage function in which temperature 
increases induce output losses. A version of the model with adaptation is provided by 




Figure 2: The role of the US and China in the coalition with the EU, 
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Table 1: Changes in welfare, emissions and R&D in two expanded 
coalitions with respect to the “Kyoto forever” scenario 
 
  Coalitions 
  (JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU,  
CHN, FSU) 
Welfare USA  -6.23% -9.46% 
Welfare JPN  10.84% 4.97% 
Welfare EU  10.60% 4.69% 
Welfare CHN  -5.67% 13.86% 
Welfare FSU  -21.54% -19.71% 
    
Emissions  3.26% -17.90% 
    
R&D USA  2.15% 4.13% 
R&D JPN  -2.05% -1.78% 
R&D EU  -6.13% -4.89% 
R&D CHN  71.83% 140.20%  
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R&D FSU  -66.40% -43.16% 
 
First, notice that China would be the big winner in the case of US 
participation. China would profit from a very large permit market, where it 
could supply an even larger amount of permits than in the scenario 
examined in section 3.1. Therefore, China’s permit supply would be 
enhanced by strategic over-investments in R&D. With respect to the already 
large amount of R&D investments in the previous scenario, the enlarged 
coalition would induce almost a doubling of China’s R&D expenditure. 
China would be the main permit seller in the emission market, thus 
benefiting more than other countries from US participation. 
 
Russia would like to profit from the larger emission market as well. It thus 
increases its strategic R&D investments in order to have more permits at its 
disposal, after having strongly reduced  its expenditure in R&D in the 
previous scenario (compared to the Marrakech situation, Russia still 
decreases its R&D by more than 40%, but R&D increases compared to the 
case in which China but not the US cooperates). Therefore, Russia increases 
its supply of emission permits with respect to the previous scenario.  
 
The demand for permits also increases because of US participation in the 
trading market. The net effect estimated by our model is an increase in the 
permit price. Notice, however, that the permit price is still 63.08% lower 
than in the Annex B-US scenario in which it is assumed that only the EU, 
Japan and Russia  trade permits. 
 
Notwithstanding a permit price higher than in the Annex B-US  + China 
climate coalition – which implies higher profits from selling “hot air” – 
Russia is still the main loser in this scenario. However, its welfare loss with 
respect to the Annex B-US coalition is lower than in the previous scenario, 
because of the increased demand for permits induced by US participation. 
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Given the higher permit price, the EU and Japan face higher abatement costs 
and therefore suffer a decrease in their welfare with respect to the scenario 
in which the Kyoto/Marrakech coalition is enlarged by China only. 
However, if we compare their performance in the scenario in which both 
China and the US adopt the Kyoto Protocol with their performance in the 
Annex B-US “Kyoto forever” scenario, we find that the larger permit market 
and the consequently relatively lower permit price still leads to a small 
increase in welfare for both Europe and Japan (see Figure 2). 
 
Let us now consider the US. The two negative effects previously 
emphasised have been offset. On the one hand, the US participates in a 
permit market where the equilibrium price is quite low (63.08% lower than 
in the Annex B-US scenario even though larger than in the absence of the US 
participation). On the other hand, total emissions are much lower and 
therefore the US suffers less damage from climate change. 
 
However, total welfare in the US does not increase (see Table 1). Even 
though the loss is small, it is clear that the adoption of the Kyoto targets 
entails a cost for the US. The net loss is small because China supplies 
permits at a low price and because total emissions decrease. Nevertheless, 
this is not sufficient to increase total US welfare with respect to the case in 
which it free-rides. 
 
Therefore, the decision by China to comply with the Kyoto Protocol indeed 
creates a new environment in which it would be easier for the US to re-join 
the Kyoto climate coalition. However, the new incentives provided by 
China’s participation in the permit market are not sufficient to yield a 
positive change in US welfare when it commits to its “Kyoto forever” 
target. The reason is twofold: first, as said, the US moves from a situation in 
which it free-rides to a new one in which it cooperates and therefore 
increases its GHG emission abatement; second, when the US cooperates, it 
commits to its Kyoto target until 2100 (the time horizon of our optimisation  
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runs). Therefore, short term benefits from low abatement cost options are 
offset by long term costs from meeting the target beyond 2012. 
 
The big winner in this scenario would be the environment. As said, total 
emissions decrease by more than 20% with respect to the climate regime 
analysed in section 3.1. This result was expected, given that all big GHG 
emitters cooperate to achieve climate change control. This climate regime is 
thus the most environmental effective among those examined within this 
study. 
3.3 A fragmented climate regime consisting of the US with China and 
the EU with Russia and Japan  
There is a third scenario that could result from the economic incentives 
arising from the implementation of an emission trading market and from 
cooperation on GHG emission abatement. There is some evidence that a 
two-bloc climate regime, consisting of the Kyoto countries (EU, Japan and 
Russia) plus a bilateral cooperation between China and the US may not be 
unrealistic. Ever since the US and China normalised their diplomatic 
relations in the late 70s, cooperation on environment, science and 
technology matters has been a mainstay of U.S.-China relations
26. In 
February 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Jiang Zemin agreed to 
establish a U.S.-China Working Group on Climate Change which now 
promotes and monitors bilateral research cooperation on climate change 
focusing on various key areas of policy and science.  
 
                                                      
26 In particular, the Agreement Between the Government of the U.S.A. and the Government 
of China on Cooperation in Science and Technology was one of the first between the two 
countries, signed during Deng Xiaoping’s historic visit to the United States in January 
1979. There are now more than 30 protocols under this umbrella agreement covering 
everything from earthquake science to fisheries, agriculture, forestry, energy, nuclear 
safety, meteorology, space technology, high energy physics, the environment, nature 
conservation, water resources management, biology, medicine, transportation and 
telecommunications.  
For more information see http://www.usembassy-
china.org.cn/sandt/BilateralActivities.html  
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Furthermore, China’s recent decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
demonstrates that the country is aware that benefits from ratification could 
be high because of its role as the largest permit seller. Chinese officials 
emphasise that the government will voluntarily try to restrict the growth of 
CO2 emissions, but it is strictly opposing any binding GHG reduction 
targets (The Japan Times, Jan. 26
th, 2002). 
 
Without binding commitments and given the high amount of “hot air” which 
can be expected from this region, China is a very attractive partner in 
climate change control activities, as already evidenced by the ongoing 
bilateral agreements between China and several other countries.
27 This is 
why the US may be able to convince China to cooperate under a joint 
climate pact. In this way, the US could achieve two goals: (i) to satisfy 
domestic political requirements by involving developing countries in their 
climate strategy; (ii) to reap high benefits from a large bilateral emissions 
market (the US and China together account for more than one-third of   
world-wide CO2 emissions, a share which is becoming larger and larger). In 
particular, the US could drastically decrease its abatement costs through 
emission trading and China could profit from selling a large amount of 
permits.  
 
What would then be the main consequences of a two-bloc climate regime 
with a first bloc formed by the EU, Japan and the FSU and a second bloc 
formed by the US and China? Some of these consequences are shown in 
Figure 3. 
 
First of all, it is clear that both the US and China lose in comparison with 
the case in which they free-ride. However, the loss for the US is small and 
could be compensated for by some ancillary benefits from GHG emission 
                                                      
27 Apart from the collaboration with the US, a bilateral cooperation on climate change has 
also been initiated with Australia in September 2003: see the official declaration at 
http://www.deh.gov.au/minister/env/2003/mr24oct203.html.  
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abatement that are not taken into account in our model. In addition, due to 
the overall lower emission levels than in previous climate regimes, the 
welfare loss is the smallest among those attained by the US when it 
participates in a climate coalition.  
 



























Even the loss for China is small – and even smaller when compared to the 
regime in which the coalition (Annex B-US + China) forms – and ancillary 
benefits, both environmental and economic, could be considerable.
28 In a 
recent companion paper (Buchner and Carraro, 2003a), we show that the 
two-bloc climate regime is what would be most preferred by both the US 
and China when they do not free-ride. Namely, it is the most preferred 
                                                      
28 This conclusion is based on our analyses of economic incentives but neglects other 
dimensions of the problem.  As argued by Zhang (2004), the proposal of a China-US 
bilateral regime may not be in the interest of China from the following perspectives: How 
does China value the importance of maintaining unity of the Group of 77? What lessons has 
China learned from bilateral, negotiations with the United Stated regarding accession to the 
WTO? What is the legitimacy of the U.S. insistence that it would rejoin the Kyoto Protocol 
only if major developing countries take on greater commitments? What are the implications 
of the US strikingly reversed position on the commitments of developing countries in New 
Delhi for initiating discussions on joint accession by the US and China? However, the 
economic model adopted for our analysis is not designed to deal with these political issues.  
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among those in which they undertake some cooperative emission abatement. 
Nonetheless, both the US and China suffer welfare losses from participating 
on the two-bloc climate regime. Can it therefore be a likely outcome of 
future negotiations on climate change control as suggested in Stewart and 
Wiener (2003)? The answer to this questions was already partly negative in 
Zhang (2004), where political considerations were the core of his remarks. 
In this paper, we add an economic perspective that also only partly supports 
the idea of a two-bloc climate regime, at least from the point of view of the 
US and China. 
 
Let us consider the EU, Japan and FSU. The inclusion of China in a 
coalition with the US is slightly beneficial for the Kyoto/Marrakech climate 
bloc, because of the enhanced environmental effectiveness of this two-bloc 
regime. Indeed, GHG emissions are almost 20% lower than in the 
benchmark case, and also lower with respect to total emissions in the 
climate regime in which the coalition (Annex B-US + China) forms. 
However, the coalition (Annex B-US + China) is the one most preferred by 
the EU and Japan because the absence of China from the Annex B-US 
coalition increases marginal abatement costs and thus induces welfare losses 
for the EU and Japan. 
 
The two-bloc climate regime is characterised again by a large expansion of 
China’s R&D investments. China over invests in R&D to increase its sales 
in the bilateral emission trading market. The segmentation of the trading 
market also explains why R&D investments within the Annex B-US coalition 
do not change. However, if the comparison is made with the coalition 
(Annex B-US + China), then it can be seen that R&D investments become 
higher for all Annex B-US countries. The reason is again the larger marginal 
abatement costs when China is not a seller in the permit market where the 
EU and Japan trade. This induces higher investments in R&D in the EU and 
Japan and also strategic R&D investments in Russia and the rest of FSU, 
which find it optimal to increase its supply of permits.  
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In short, the two-bloc climate regime discussed in this section could be 
beneficial to EU, Japan and Russia, even though less beneficial than other 
regimes, particularly for the EU and Japan. By contrast, Russia may favour 
the two-bloc regime, because of the higher economic benefits that it could 
reap in the trading market with EU and Japan when China trades permits 
only with the US. However, the two-bloc regime reduces welfare in the US 
and China (even though the economic loss is the smallest one among all 
climate regimes that we analysed). Therefore, other mechanisms must be 
designed to enhance participation incentives for the US and China.  
 
Among these mechanisms, issue linkage is an obvious candidate. In 
previous paper (Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo and Marchiori, 2002) we have 
shown that a technology-based issue linkage is unlikely to induce the US to 
re-join the Kyoto coalition. Mainly because of the lack of credibility of the 
proposed mechanisms. However, issue linkage, e.g. based on trade 
concessions, could work better with China, in the same way in which it 
helped to induce Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
The basic problem that remains unresolved is how to enhance US 
participation incentives. The economic mechanisms described in this paper 
does not seem to be sufficient. Those described in Buchner and Carraro 
(2004) – based on the technology protocol proposed by Barrett (2002) –  are 
sufficient, but unlikely to produce relevant GHG emission reductions. 
Therefore, other policy strategies, possibly complementary to the Kyoto 
framework, need to be identified and carefully assessed (see Aldy, Barrett 
and Stavins, 2003; Barrett and Stavins, 2004; for a first step into this 
direction).  
 
Nonetheless, there is a result in this paper that cannot be neglected. If the 
US, for some environmental or political reasons, decides to enhance its 
effort to control GHG emissions and chooses to participate in an  
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international trading scheme, than a bilateral deal with China would be more 
beneficial for the US (in terms of economic gains) than participation in a 
global trading scheme. 
  
4.  Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the evolution of climate change policy after the 
Marrakech negotiations, focusing on the one hand on the economic forces 
which have led to the emergence of the present climate regime and on the 
other hand on the implications of this situation for the future of climate 
negotiations. 
 
Our analysis has drawn attention on the role of China and of the new 
economic incentives that China’s adoption of the Kyoto Protocol and its 
participation in the international permit market could provide. What 
emerges from this analysis is a situation in which the decision of China to 
participate in the climate coalition is beneficial for both the EU and Japan, 
because it lowers abatement costs. However, China’s participation penalises 
Russia, because it lowers Russia’s profits from selling permits.  
 
We have shown that the US is also damaged by China’s participation in the 
coalition with the EU, Japan and Russia. The reason is the increase in GHG 
emissions induced by the lower incentives to adopt climate friendly 
technologies. In addition, the US misses the opportunity to abate emissions 
at the low abatement cost that China’s participation induces. Therefore, one 
may wonder whether the US would be better off by cooperating with China 
– as well as with the EU, Japan and Russia – on GHG emission control. The 
answer is negative. Although cooperation provides some benefits, total 
welfare does not increase and the US is still better off by free-riding on the 
other countries’ (small) emission reductions. 
 
However, cooperation between the US and the other countries could take a 
different form. For example, the US could propose a bilateral deal to China  
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that may be induced to cooperate with the US rather than with the Annex B-
US countries. In this scenario, the US and China form their own  bilateral 
permit market, whereas the EU, Japan and Russia trade in a second different 
market. We have shown that, in this scenario, the environmental 
effectiveness of the climate regime is greatly increased and welfare losses 
are small in all countries. 
 
Our conclusions can be summarised as follows. The participation of the US 
in a climate regime is not likely, at least in the short run. The US is more 
likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join the present Kyoto group (even 
when it includes China). However, a two-bloc regime would become the 
most preferred option if both China and the US, for some political or 
environmental reasons, decide to cooperate on GHG emission control. If the 
US decides to cooperate, the climate regime that provides the highest 
economic incentives to the cooperating countries is the one in which China 
and the US cooperate bilaterally, with the Annex B-US countries remaining 
within the Kyoto framework. 
 
Is it sufficient to suggest that climate change negotiations could take a new 
direction by abandoning the Kyoto framework to adopt a new multi-bloc 
approach similar to the one prevailing in international trade negotiations? 
Probably not. The above conclusions need cautious consideration. In 
particular, our empirical analysis focuses on economic incentives, whereas 
recent climate negotiations have shown that decisions are often taken on the 
basis of political, strategic, social or even ethical considerations. In addition, 
the model used in our analysis is a simplified representation of the world 
economic system, even though it captures the main economic mechanisms 
and the related incentive schemes. However, our analysis clearly suggests 
that China can play a very important role in future climate negotiations. 
 
A further development of our analysis could be the comparison of different 
multi-bloc climate regimes. Blocs could be identified at  regional level (e.g.  
  28
EU, NAFTA, ASEAN) or could be defined by political or environmental 
interests (e.g. G77, AOSIS). Including more climate coalitions in the 
analysis could of course change the ranking of the regimes. Some 
preliminary results are in Buchner,  and Carraro (2003a), where the 
economic consequences of the formation of a wide range of partial and/or 
regional climate coalitions are analysed. 
 
Another research direction is the integration of a mix of policy instruments 
in our analysis of participation incentives. Therefore, not only emission 
trading, but also other policy tools could be implemented and their relative 
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Appendix: The FEEM-RICE Model 
 
The FEEM-RICE model is an extension of Nordhaus and Yang’s (1996) regional RICE 
model of integrated assessment, which is one of the most popular and manageable integrated 
assessment tools for the study of climate change (see, for instance, Eyckmans and Tulkens 
2001). It is basically a single sector optimal growth model which has been extended to 
incorporate the interaction between economic activities and climate. One such model has been 
developed for each macro region into which the world is divided (USA, Japan, Europe, China, 
Former Soviet Union, and Rest of the World). 
 
Within each region a central planner chooses the optimal paths of fixed investment and 
emission abatement that maximise the present value of per capita consumption. Output (net of 
climate change) is used for investment and consumption and is produced according to   
constant returns Cobb-Douglas technology, which combines the inputs from capital and 
labour with the level of technology. Population (taken to be equal to full employment) and 
technology levels grow over time in an exogenous fashion, whereas capital accumulation is 
governed by the optimal rate of investment. There is a wedge between output gross and net of 
climate change effects, the size of which is dependent upon the amount of abatement (rate of 
emission reduction) as well as the change in global temperature. The model is completed by 
three equations representing emissions (which are related to output and abatement), carbon 
cycle (which relates concentrations to emissions), and climate module (which relates the 
change in temperature relative to 1990 levels to carbon concentrations) respectively. 
 
In our extension of the model, technical change is no longer exogenous. Instead, the issue of 
endogenous technical change is tackled by following the ideas contained in both Nordhaus 
(1999) and Goulder and Mathai (2000) and accordingly modifying Nordhaus and Yang’s 
(1996) RICE model. Doing so requires the input of a number of additional parameters, some 
of which have been estimated using information provided by Coe and Helpman (1995), while 
the remaining parameters were calibrated so as to reproduce the business-as-usual scenario 
generated by the RICE model with exogenous technical change. 
 
In particular, the following factors are included: first, endogenous technical change affecting 
factor productivity is introduced. This is done by adding the stock of knowledge in each 
production function and by relating the stock of knowledge to R&D investments. Second,  
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induced technical change is introduced, by allowing the stock of knowledge to affect  the 
emission-output ratio as well. Finally, international technological spillovers are also 
accounted for in the model. 
 
Within each version of the model, countries play a non-cooperative Nash game in a dynamic 
setting, which yields an Open Loop Nash equilibrium (see Eyckmans and Tulkens 2001, for 
an explicit derivation of first order conditions of the optimum problem). This is a situation in 
which, in each region, the planner maximises social welfare subject to the individual resource 
and capital constraints and the climate module, given the emission and investment strategies 
(in the base case) and the R&D expenditure strategy (in the endogenous technological change 
case) of all other players. 
 
The Standard Model without Induced Technical Change 
As  previously mentioned, it is assumed for the purpose of this model that innovation is 
brought about by R&D spending which contributes to the accumulation of the stock of 
existing knowledge. Following an approach pioneered by Griliches (1979, 1984), it is 
assumed that the stock of knowledge is a factor of production, which therefore enhances the 
rate of productivity (see also the discussion in Weyant 1997; Weyant and Olavson 1999). In 
this formulation, R&D efforts prompt non-environmental technical progress, but with 
different modes and elasticities. More precisely, the RICE production function output is 
modified as follows: 
 
 ] ) , ( ) , ( [ ) , ( ) , ( ) , (
1 γ γ β − = t n K t n L t n K t n A t n Q F R
n       ( 1 )  
 
where  Q is output (gross of climate change effects), A the exogenously given level of 
technology and KR, L, and KF are respectively the inputs from knowledge capital, labour, and 
physical capital. 
In (1), the stock of knowledge has a region-specific output elasticity equal to βn (n=1,…6). It 
should be noted that, as long as this coefficient is positive, the output production process is 
characterised by increasing returns to scale, in line with current theories of endogenous 
growth. This implicitly assumes the existence of cross-sectoral technological spillovers within 
each country (Romer, 1990). In addition, it should be noted that while allowing for R&D-
driven technological progress, we maintain the possibility that technical improvements can  
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also be determined exogenously (the path of A is the same as that specified in the original 
RICE model). The stock accumulates in the usual fashion: 
 
 
  ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( & ) 1 , ( t n K t n D R t n K R R R δ − + = +        ( 2 )  
 
where R&D is the expenditure in Research and Development and δR is the rate of knowledge 
depreciation. Finally, it is recognised that some resources are absorbed by R&D spending. 
That is: 
 
  ) , ( & ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( t n D R t n I t n C t n Y + + =        ( 3 )  
 
where Y is net output (net of climate change effects as specified in the RICE model), C is 
consumption and I gross fixed capital formation. 
At this stage the model maintains the same emissions function as Nordhaus’ RICE model 
which will be modified in the next section: 
 
 ) , ( )] , ( 1 )[ , ( ) , ( t n Q t n t n t n E μ σ − =         ( 4 )  
 
where σ can be loosely defined as the emissions-output ratio, E stands for emissions and μ for 
the rate of abatement effort. The policy variables included in the model are rates of fixed 
investment and of emission abatement. For the other variables, the model specifies a time path 
of exogenously given values. Interestingly, this is also the case for technology level A and of 
the emissions-output ratio σ. Thus, the model presented so far assumes no induced technical 
change, i.e. an exogenous environmental technical change, and a formulation of productivity 
that evolves both exogenously and endogenously. In the model, investment fosters economic 
growth (thereby driving up emissions) while abatement is the only policy variable used for 
reducing emissions. 
 
Induced Technical Change 
In the second step of our model formulation, endogenous environmental technical change is 
accounted for. It is assumed that the stock of knowledge – which in the previous formulation 
was only a factor of production - also serves the purpose of reducing, ceteris paribus, the  
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level of carbon emissions. Thus, in the second formulation, R&D efforts prompt both 
environmental and non-environmental technical progress, although with different modes and 
elasticities.
29 More precisely, the RICE emission-output relationship is modified as follows: 
 
 ) , ( )] , ( 1 ))][ , ( exp( [ ) , ( t n Q t n t n K t n E R n n n μ α χ σ − − + =      (4’) 
 
In (4’), knowledge reduces the emissions-output ratio with an elasticity of αn, which is also 
region-specific; the parameter χn is a scaling coefficient, whereas σn is the value to which the 
emission-output ratio tends asymptotically as the stock of knowledge increases without limit. 
In this formulation, R&D contributes to output productivity on the one hand, and affects the 
emission-output ratio - and therefore the overall level of pollution emissions - on the other . 
 
Knowledge Spillovers 
Previous formulations do not include the effect of potential spillovers produced by 
knowledge, and therefore ignore the fact that both technologies and organisational structures 
disseminate  internationally. Modern economies are linked by vast and continually expanding 
flows of trade, investment, people and ideas. The technologies and choices of one region are 
and will inevitably be affected by developments in other regions. 
 
Following the work of Weyant and Olavson (1999), who suggest that the definition of 
spillovers in  an induced technical change context be kept plain and simple (in the light of a 
currently incomplete understanding of the problem) , disembodied, or knowledge spillovers 
are modelled (see Romer 1990). They refer to the R&D carried out and paid for by one party 
that produces benefits to other parties which then have better or more inputs than before or 
can somehow benefit from R&D carried out elsewhere. Therefore, in order to capture 
international spillovers of knowledge, the stock of world knowledge is introduced in the third 
version of the FEEM-RICE model, both in the production function and in the emission-output 
ratio equation. Equations (1) and (4’) are then revised as follows: 
 
                                                      
29 Obviously, we could have introduced two different types of R&D efforts, respectively contributing to the 
growth of an environmental knowledge stock and a production knowledge stock. Such undertaking however is 
made difficult by the need  to specify variables and calibrate  parameters for which there is no immediately 
available and sound information in the literature.  
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is defined in such a way as not to include a country’s own stock. 
 
Emission Trading 
As mentioned above, throughout the analysis we assume the adoption of efficient policies. As 
a consequence, the model also includes the possibility of flexibility mechanisms. In particular 
we compare the two cases in which emission trading takes place amongst all original Annex I 
countries (including the US),  first  with one in which trading is allowed amongst Annex 1 
countries without the US, and then  one in which emission trading takes place amongst all 
Annex I countries without the US and Russia. 
When running the model in the presence of emission trading, two additional equations are 
considered: 
 
  ) , ( ) ( ) , ( & ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( t n NIP t p t n D R t n I t n C t n Y + + + =      (3’) 
 
which replaces equation (3) and: 
 
  ) , ( ) ( ) , ( t n NIP n Kyoto t n E + =        
 (6) 
 
where NIP(n,t) is the net demand for permits and Kyoto(n) are the emission targets set in the 
Kyoto Protocol for the signatory countries and the BAU levels for the non-signatory ones. 
According to (3’), resources produced by the economy must be devoted, in addition to  
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consumption, investment, and research and development, to net purchases of emission 
permits. Equation (6) states that a region’s emissions may exceed the limit set in Kyoto if 
permits are bought, and vice versa in the case of sales of permits. Note that p(t) is the price of 
a unit of tradable emission permits expressed in terms of the numeraire output price. 
Moreover, there is an additional policy variable to be considered in this case, which is net 
demand for permits NIP. 
 
In terms of the possibility of emission trading, the sequence whereby a Nash equilibrium is reached 
can be described as follows. Each region maximises its utility subject to  its individual resource and 
capital constraints, now including the Kyoto constraint, and the climate module for a given emission 
(i.e. abatement) strategy of all the other players and a given price of permits p(0) (in the first round 
this is set at an arbitrary level). When all regions have made their optimal choices, the overall net 
demand for permits is computed at the given price. If the sum of net demands in each period is 
approximately zero, a Nash equilibrium is obtained; otherwise the price is revised as a function of the 
market disequilibrium and each region’s decision process starts again. 